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DELAWARE LAW AS APPLIED PUBLIC
CHOICE THEORY: BILL CARY AND THE
BASIC COURSE AFTER 1WENTY-FIVE
YEARS
William W. Bratton*
I. CHARTER COMPETITION, CARY,
AND THE BASIC COURSE

Twenty-five years ago the late William L. Cary used the pages of
the Yale Law Journal to serve his famous indictment of Delaware
corporate law. 1 His article reviewed Delaware's code and leading
opinions of its courts and suggested that Delaware law had "no
public policy left ... except the objective of raising revenue." 2 To
Cary, the "public policy" at stake was the integrity of corporate
managers. 3 The state's revenue objective, he said, led it to "grant
management unilateral control untrammeled by other interests," 4
thereby sacrificing the national interest. Delaware was, in short, a
corrupt sovereign.
Cary's denunciation was soon countered by a commendation of
Delaware articulated under the rubric of jurisdictional competition
theory. 5 Under this theory, what Cary saw as subject matter for
regulation in the public interest instead was seen as appropriately
left to decisionmaking within firms-firms choosing among the
various states for the best possible legal regime in which to

' Samuel Tyler Research Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law
School. The author was born in Delaware.
1
William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663 (1974).
2
I d. at 684; see also Comment, Law For Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law
of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861 (1969) (discussing how selling of Delaware's corporate laws
is state business).
3
See Cary, supra note 1, at 671-72 (noting that one focus of article was that "necessary
high standards of conduct [by management] cannot be maintained by courts shackled to
public policy based upon the production of revenue"). The managers' integrity is the
competing public policy.
4
Id. at 697-98.
5
ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 32 (1993).
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incorporate or reincorporate. 6 Such firms, said the theory, were
seeking a predictable, cost-reductive legal regime. 7 Delaware was
said to provide this regime with comprehensive case law, wellspecified indemnification rules, and an expert judiciary. 8 The firms
also were said to seek a guarantee that their domiciliary state would
maintain its legal system's desirability. 9 A chartering jurisdiction
remained free to change its politics and transform itself into an
unresponsive domicile even as its domiciliary firms had incurred
access costs ex ante. 10 To be competitive, a jurisdiction had to reduce
this defection possibility by making a credible commitment to
remain constant to its customer firms' interests. For Delaware, the
requisite commitment followed from the combination of a large
number of incorporations and a small population. 11 This situation
caused franchise tax revenues to make up a substantial portion of
its tax draw, 12 which in turn subordinated its politics to its chartering business. 13 Delaware also invested in assets specific to its
incorporation business-its code and case law and its judicial and
administrative expertise-and set up internal process rules to
protect these reputational assets from impairment by antimanagerialist politicians and judges. 14 The capital, thus accumulated and protected, bolstered Delaware's market position. Other
states could not credibly precommit to offer superior service, and
thus were deterred from incurring the start-up costs necessary for

6

Id.
Id.
8
Id. at 33-34, 39 n.20.
9
Id. at 32.
10
See id. at 42-43 (giving example of New Jersey's corporate code revamping just after
turn of century).
11
The need for a "supermajority" of two-thirds of both legislative houses to change the
Delaware code also helped. Id.
12
I d. at 36-37. Franchise taxes amounted to 17.7% of Deiaware's total tax revenues in
1990. Id. at 10.
13
Id. at 38.
14
These assets include directing corporate matters to a specialized chancery court,
appointing rather than electing its judges, limiting judges to twelve-year terms, and requiring
two-thirds majorities of both houses of its legislature to approve corporation code amendments. Id . at 38-42.
7
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entry into the market. 15 A first-mover advantage 1n Delaware
resulted. 16
This scenario still holds a central place in our working model of
corporate law. But jurisdictional competition theory's concomitant
assertion that charter competition assures optimal constraints on
management misbehavior, the "race to the top" story, quickly went
the way of history. The theory bypassed the problem of the shareholders' lack of influence over state lawmaking processes with a
reference to the control market deterrent: Management's option of
exit through reincorporation in another state adequately disciplined
the states, while the possibility of shareholder exit by tender to a
hostile offeror adequately disciplined management. This tale could
not be told after managers and state politicians collaborated 17 in the
1980s to hobble the . market deterrent with anti-takeover
legislation. 18 It became manifest that management capture of the
state lawmakers led to suboptimal corporate lawmaking in the
midst of active competition for charters.
Charter competition's proponents accordingly shifted to a middle
ground position, defending the state system except to the extent
that it permitted constraints on the market for corporate control. 19
Other observers revived Cary's point that state corporate law should

15

See id. at 40 (noting length of time would be "considerable" to equal Delaware legal
expertise).
16
Id. at 40-41, 43-44.
17
See Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion,
57 U. CIN. L. REV. 457, 461 n.ll (1988) (showing that although anti-takeover legislation is
interest-group legislatiun, it did not result from efforts of centrally organized management
lobbying effort but rather from individual corporation interests).
18
For descriptions, see Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Takeover
Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168 (1999); Arthur
Pinto, The Constitution and the Market for Corporate Control: State Antitakeover Statues
After CTS Corp., 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 699 (1988); Elliott Weiss, What Lawyers Do When
the Emperor Has No Clothes: Evaluating CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Its
Progeny-Part I, 78 GEO. L.J. 1655 (1990).
19
See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAw 222 (1991) (concluding that race-to-top stands as refuted, but proposition
that competition creates "powerful tendency" to enact shareholder beneficial laws remains
vital); Roberta Romano, Law as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L.
ECON. & 0RGS. 225 (1985) (trying to bring empirical research to bear no issue); Ralph K.
Winter, The "Race for the Top" Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1526,
1528 (1989) (expressing more confidence in view that Cary was wrong than in view that
Delaware was leading race to top).
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be preempted, at least in part. 20 The middle ground result, they
said, developed from a defect in the charter competition system.
Given the competition, the states had to focus on the variables that ·
influence reincorporation decisions. 21 That focus caused the states
to cater to management preferences rather than concern themselves
with the maximization of shareholder value. Accordingly, states
pursued suboptimal policies of management accommodation
respecting fiduciary rules and anti-takeover legislation. 22
This debate continues, directed to the question of the desirability
of federal intervention. 23 As such, the debate figures only peripherally in my teaching. Federal intervention in corporate law does not,
after all, hold a place on Washington agendas these days. At the
same time, however, the operative description of Delaware lawmaking under charter competition, to which there is little fundamental
disagreement, takes a more prominent place in my pedagogy with
each passing year. This prominence follows from the fact that
Delaware's importance as the corporate lawgiver has increased in
the quarter-century since the publication of Bill Cary's article. As
Delaware cases take up a greater proportionate share of the
syllabus, my description of corporate law becomes a description of
characteristics of Delaware cases and of the personalities of
Delaware judges. Charter competition figures prominently in that
description.
20

Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1435, 1495 (1992); Bebchuk & Ferrell,
supra note 18; William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition,
Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861, 1925-48 (1995);
Roberta S. Karmel, Is It Time for a Federal Corporation Law?, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 55, 91-96
(1991); see Joel Seligman, Essay, The Case for Minimum Corporate Law Standards, 49 MD.
L. REV. 947,971-74 (1990) (proposing limited federal preemptive in three specific areas); see
also Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 60-63 (1993) (suggesting
need for concurrent federal legislation that does not entirely preempt state legislation).
21
Bebchuk, supra note 20, at 1452, 1454.
22
Id. at 1462-63, 1468, 1488. In addition, competition can cause the states to use their
lawmaking power to impair market discipline even further, as the proliferation of antitakeover statutes demonstrates. Id. at 1467; see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469,
4 71, 483 (1987) (stating state competition generates efficient rules).
23
A new empirical debate also can be expected in light of Robert Daines's paper, Does
Delaware Law Improve Firm Value? (New York University Law and Business Working
Paper, Oct. 1999) (finding statistically significant increment in value, measured by Tobin's
Q, for firms incorporated in Delaware).
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I also look to charter competition to explain Delaware's growing
prominence in the basic course. I do so, however, without offering
empirical evidence showing an increase in Delaware's market share
of the charters of publicly-traded firms . Delaware's enhanced
prominence as a corporate lawmaker does not require a bigger
market share than the oft-stated figure of fifty percent. Instead, the
enhanced prominence results from the nature of Delaware's
customer base and the product it sells. Charter competition caused
state corporate codes to converge in their broad outlines long ago. 24
Delaware's code stands out more for its stability over time than for
its clarity or state-of-the-art drafting. It follows that Delaware's
case law, judges, and speedy process figure much more prominently
than its code in explanations of the success of its legal product line. 25
Studies of reincorporating firms confirm this assessment, showing
that firms migrate to Delaware because they either anticipate
activities that increase the risk of litigation or plan to engage in
mergers and· acquisitions, the latter of course also being an activity
that carries a high risk oflitigation. 26 Couple this tendency with the
consistent intensity of merger and acquisition activity during the
last two decades, and Delaware emerges as a magnet that attracts
litigation respecting mergers and acquisitions. The result is a stack
of Delaware merger and acquisition cases that towers above the
stack of cases reported by all other jurisdictions combined.
Delaware's enhanced presence in the basic course reflects this
fact, even without mergers taking a large time allocation in the
syllabus. When I took the basic course twenty-five years ago, we
read Cheff v. Mathes 27 in connection with fiduciary duties and ran

24

William J. Carney, Federalism and Corporate Law: A Non-Delaware View of the
Results of Competition , in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION:
PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 153, 169-82
(William Bratton et al. eds., 1996).
25
Bayless Manning identified the judiciary as the prime attraction, comparing Delaware
to the medieval law merchant. Andrew G. T . Moore II et al. , State Competition: Panel
Response, 8 CARDOZO L . REV. 779, 784-85 (1987) (describing Manning's response in roundtable
discussion). For confirmation of this point from a game theory perspective, see Ian Ayres,
Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U . CHI.
L. REV. 1391, 1414-15 (1992) (reviewing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORA.TE LAW (1991)).
26
ROMANO, supra note 5, at 33-34.
27
199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
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out of time before we got to the casebook's merger chapter. We
otherwise learned very little about mergers and management duties
respecting them. Now, complex merger cases come up early in the
term because of the wide variety of issues decided therein during
the intervening quarter-century. They figure into the basic
discussion of the allocation of authority between management and
shareholders 28 and in the presentation of the duty of care, 29 and they
also take up a larger proportional place in discussions of fiduciary
duty. When I try to explain these cases' results and the opinions'
characteristics to my students, I find myself returning again and
again to charter competition and its effects on litigation in Delaware.
Since I take the middle-ground view of charter competition, the
notion of Delaware as a responsive sovereign figures into these
explanations. Since I also subscribe to the notion that the charter
competition system has a structural defect that causes corporate law
to tilt markedly in the diredion of favoring management interests,
however, Bill Cary's lessons always remain on the table in my class,
although with a difference in emphasis. I speak of capture rather
than corruption, omitting the public interest story of regulatory
motivation that grounded Cary's denunciation of Delaware as a
corrupt sovereign. What Cary characterized as defection from a
duty to pursue the general good can be given a more technocratic
gloss by reference to capture theories of regulation. These theories
depict regulation as an arena in which special interests compete to
use government power for advantage and make the public choice
assumption that regulators should not be expected to behave
differently than actors in private economic relations. 30 There is still
a normative judgment at the bottom line, when the regulatory
results are shown to be economically suboptimal. The self-inter-

28

See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996) (holding stockholder vote dispositive);
Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding directors violated duty
of loyalty to shareholders).
29
See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (holding board negligent in
shareholder class action suit).
30
Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 168-69 (1990).
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ested behavior of the regulators thus emerges as an ordinary course
phenomenon that prompts no special moral opprobrium. 31
However, neither does it prompt any sort of commendation. To
the extent that Delaware does earn a commendation in the framework of a capture model, it does so because it must answer to more
than one interest group. Management remains the prime concern
in this multiple demand picture, of course. But the system also
allows shareholders, lawyers, and even judges to register competing
demands. Although it remains pronounced, the tilt toward management is not absolute. The cases take on a complex, mediative
quality as they try to satisfy the competing claimants. This quality,
in turn, disrupts student expectations. They come to the basic
course expecting the cases to be principled in a narrow sense.
Under the expected regime, judges are disinterested public servants
whose empowerment and integrity follow from a commitment to
common-law principles. The students expect the principles to come
to bear in the cases from a dominant position, controlling rather
than following from the facts even w bile building in possibilities for
flexible application in the interest of justice. This rule of principle
imports coherence to the system along with stability over time. A
case law that is sold by its jurisdiction to business actors presents
a stark contrast. It must remain responsive and subordinated to
dynamically changing business fact patterns even as it mediates
among conflicting interests. This causes it to be unstable over time
and apparently disconnected from a rule of principle. I try to
persuade my students that there is an important element of
coherence nonetheless, and I draw on a multiple demand model of
Delaware regulatory capture in trying to teach that lesson. Even so,
Delaware's legitimacy from the point of view of the narrow rule of
principle presents a very different question. I remit that question
to the students to answer for themselves. It is their privilege to join
Cary's judgment of corruption. I stress, however, that to do so
automatically is to miss the point of the exercise.

,,
31

I find this point, by the way, a hard one to teach. Most students come to the class with
the same public interest assumptions that inform Cary's article . They have an understandable inclination to join him in condemnation.
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The succeeding parts of this Essay develop these points more
fully. Part II sets out a multiple demand model of regulatory
capture of Delaware. Part III brings the model to bear on the case
law, looking at its impact, first on the judicial role, and second on a
problem of indeterminacy much-discussed of late.
II. A MULTIPLE DEMA.ND MODEL OF
DELAWARE REGULATORY CAPTURE
A. REINCORPORATION AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL

In the standard story of regulatory competition theory, jurisdictions can compete only to the extent that citizens have mobility
among them . Free entrance and exit give the citizens a basis to
choose, turning them into consumers of public goods and regulation.
Citizen choice, in turn, deters regulatory capture. When interest
groups gain undue influence and procure costly regulation, the
citizens disadvantaged thereby exit the captured jurisdiction.
Regulatory competition thus keeps regulators' attention focused on
citizen preferences on the assumption that regulators do not like to
see their citizens migrate elsewhere. Corporate charter competition,
however, does not follow this pattern. Mobility and exit once again
are the mainsprings. But capture is not thereby deterred because
with corporations the capturing interest controls the mobile
consumer and the system simultaneously deprives the disadvantaged interest of mobility.
The system works well from the point of view of the chartering
firm, considered as an entity without internal conflicts of interest.
Exit through reincorporation gives the managers a potent ex post
enforcement device that keeps the chartering state responsive to its
interests. The chartering state's desire to continue to attract new
incorporations discourages any blocking of the exit route for fear of
scaring off future prospective incorporators. The combination of the
state's rent incentive and the exit deterrent also mitigates any
collective action problems the firms might encounter in getting
needed legislation in the future. Should desired legislation not be
obtained, exit can be effected unilaterally, and there will remain up
to forty-nine states from which to choose. Since the chartering
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state's rent flow includes fees to practicing lawyers in addition to
franchise taxes, there always will be key actors on the supply side
ready to work with the firms in securing regulation that suits their
preferences. No trade association needs to be formed for the
purpose of assuring effective lobbying. Delaware practice confirms
this point. It delegates to its bar association both agenda control
over, and drafting responsibility for, any amendments to its
corporate code. The bar and legislature have a longstanding
"understanding" that amendments to the corporations code must
first be drafted and approved by the bar association's corporate law
section and the bar association itself. 32
Even as the charter system allows for exit from an unsatisfactory
jurisdiction and compels the jurisdiction's lawmakers to attend to
the preferences of the firms incorporated therein, it holds out no
guarantee of responsiveness to the more particular preferences of
the firms' shareholders. This imbalance stems from the fact that
the exit privilege applies to firms rather than to shareholders, and
corporate law has evolved under charter competition so as to block
shareholder access to the determination of the firm's reincorporation
decision. Although the shareholders have a vote respecting
reincorporation, a favorable board vote must come first. Management thus controls the agenda. 33 The market system holds out no
route around this barrier because it creates no incentives to
encourage the development of a shareholder-favorable state. Nor
could the market for corporate control provide the shareholders any
relief, even assuming the removal of antitakeover legislation.
Successful control contests, whether by takeover or proxy fight,
merely displace one group of managers with another. The displac-

32

See Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency,
15 DEL. J . CORP. L. 885, 899-901 (1990). The section itself performs the legislative function
of sifting the comments of interested parties. Each of the three largest corporate servicing
firms have representatives to the section. !d. at 899-901, 910. The legislature rubber stamps
the bar's recommendations; the executive branch's role is limited to representation at bar
association meetings on invitation. Id. at 898-99; see Moore et al., supra note 25, at 779-81
(describing this "understanding" more fully). Active drafting and discussion is largely limited
to the corporate law section. David S. Schaffer, Jr., Delaware's Limit on Director Liability:
How the Market for Incorporation Shapes Corporate Law, 10 HARV. J. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 665,
682-84 (1987).
33
Bratton & McCahery, supra note 20, at 1929-36.
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ing group, unless it has taken the firm private, remains in an
agency relationship with the firm's shareholders and thus has no
reason to look for a jurisdiction activated by the shareholder
interest. Meanwhile, capture by charter competition exacerbates
the shareholders' collective action problems even as it ameliorates
management's problems. State law not only blocks shareholder
access to the charter and the reincorporation machinery, it provides
only management with routine compensation for expenses incurred
in voting contests. 34 Finally, because of the peculiarities of our
federal constitutional structure, the competing jurisdictions that
lack an incentive to balance shareholder and manager interests
have national lawmaking power over the shareholders of their
domiciliary corporations. In the corporate variant of regulatory
competition, then, exit from one jurisdiction provides no remedy for
the dissatisfactions of the disadvantaged interest group. The
system instead locks it in.
The bar and the judiciary emerge as the only groups within the
chartering state having any incentive to advance the shareholders'
interest. The judicial role is discussed in Part III; here I note that
only limited assistance can be expected from the bar. Litigating
lawyers promote shareholder welfare as an incident to making a
living as enforcers of the fiduciary deterrent. This focus is not the
same as an interest in promoting shareholder value. For example,
the lawyers have an incentive to promote lawmaking that enhances
shareholder value by strengthening the corporate-control market
only if the change will prompt additional litigable disputes. The
same would go for lawmaking that enhances possibilities for
relational monitoring by nominees of institutional shareholders.
Shareholder-favorable incentives accordingly are unlikely to issue
from the bar in practice. Fiduciary breaches that bring rents to
lawyers stem from excess management influence; any market or
self-regulatory governance strategy that has a cognizable chance of
working well in practice ultimately threatens to diminish those

34
This regime compensates only shareholder winners in board control contests and
provides no compensation at all to shareholders who oppose management positions in issue
contests. Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291, 293 (N.Y. 1955).
For discussion, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal
Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1126-29 (1990).
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rents by reducing the incidence of unproductive influence activities.
In addition, the bar's interest diverges from the shareholders'
interest even within the sphere of fiduciary enforcement, with the
bar favoring a system that trades substantial money judgments to
shareholders in exchange for substantial attorneys' fees.
In short, no interest group in the chartering state has a rent
incentive reliably tied to the advancement of the shareholders'
interest in the minimization of agency costs within the firm. This
situation leaves the shareholders to self-organize in order to
advance an agenda in state lawmaking processes. The same
collective action problem that prevents political action within firms,
however, presumably makes this organization difficult. The charter
competition system makes it even more difficult by structurally
limiting prospects for payoffs: Any meaningful shareholder effort
would have to register successfully in multiple jurisdictions. 35
B. COMPETING DEMANDS

1. Threatened Federal Intervention as a Proxy for the Shareholder Interest. The capture model of corporate lawmaking
incentives should not be taken to imply a "race to the bottom"
conclusion. Many matters of state corporate law find shareholder
and management interests in alignment. In addition, the deal
struck between the chartering state and management can never be
entirely secure because the possibility of removal of corporate
lawmaking to the federal level inheres in our federal constitutional
structure. Delaware, as the entity most dependent on corporate law
revenues, is the contracting state most prone to view that possibility
as a threat.
It seems safe to assume that Delaware actors remain highly
averse to possible destructive exercises of federal preemptive power.
Although this is a low-probability event, the potential level of injury
to Delaware remains high and federal law reform discussions during
the past twenty-five years have given occasional cause for concern.

35

It comes as no surprise that federal law has emerged as the preferred venue for
organized shareholder efforts to alter legal structures so as to make firms operate more
effectively.
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Federal assumption of the large fiduciary component of the corporate law product might deprive Delaware of the principal justification for its premium price. An outbreak of price competition could
follow in the market, along with erosion of Delaware's position as an
informational center. Litigation business, meanwhile, would
disperse across the country as plaintiffs shop for hospitable federal .
venues. Delaware actors accordingly have high-powered incentives
to avoid exciting the creation of new federallaw. 36 This structural
constant creates secondary incentives for Delaware lawmakers to
respond to shareholder interests. 37
Recognition of a perceived federal threat implies a model in
which Delaware faces conflicting demands, each threatening
potential negative consequences. First, the management interest
must be satisfied to prevent corporate migration out of the state and
entry into competition among competing states. Second, federal
actors, as proxies for the shareholders, must be satisfied to avoid
destructive intervention. The conflicting demands complicate the
business of response; Professor Eisenberg has suggested that the
conflict leaves Delaware with an incentive to avoid taking the lead
in adopting rules favoring managers at the shareholders' expense.
Other states have a different incentive. If they offer innovative side
payments to management, they may siphon business from Delaware; if the federal government intervenes to stop them, they lose
little. So long as a given state has a small market share, its actions
attract little attention. Delaware, in contrast, cannot take any
significant steps without close scrutiny nationwide. 38 It remains
under pressure to follow new developments elsewhere, but emerges
in a mediative role.
Evidence of the multiple demand model's robustness can be found
in the pattern of Delaware lawmaking. Given statutory convergence
and the dominance of the management interest, the problems of
:JS Anecdotal evidence shows that Delaware lawmakers keep federal intervention in mind
when they take politically sensitive steps. Alva, supra note 32, at 906-08.
37
A number of commentators have recognized this possibility. Bebchuk, supra note 20,
at 1455; Cary, supra note 1, at 688; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1512 (1989).
38
Eisenberg, supra note 37, at 1512-13; see also Bebchuk, supra note 20, at 1455
(pointing out that there remains range on which states can maneuver without fear offederal
intervention).
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conflicting demand show up only intermittently in the corporate
legislative process. Anti-takeover legislation is the principal recent
instance, and Delaware's corporate bar moved late and with caution
in putting an anti-takeover statute before its legislature. 39 The
conflicts become more apparent in the adjudication of fiduciary
cases, as we will see in Part III.
A question arises as to how Delaware, alone in this competing
demand situation, can structure a mediative response without losing
business in a market still keyed to management preferences.
Delaware's mediative output can be explained in terms of the
interests of managers as a group-well-timed interventions to
protect shareholders serve to defuse the federal threat and to make
Delaware a buffer state that protects corporations from federal
intervention. The benefits of a mediative jurisprudence, however,
are more questionable from the point of view of individual managers
seeking an optimal environment. An individual manager's incentive
would appear to lie in causing the firm to migrate to a state
adopting a less equivocal anti-takeover policy and in free-riding on
the firms that stay in Delaware. Of course, once a large number of
firms did likewise over time, successfully shopping for more
responsive jurisdictions, federal intervention would become more
likely. The same thing might happen if a large number of firms left
Delaware in a bunch, starting a new race to the bottom.
Two factors make the multiple demand picture plausible in light
of the constant threat of management exit. First, no full-service
alternative domicile exists, and only a handful of other jurisdictions
have strong incentives to incur the start-up costs to market a full
service operation. None of thos€ potential competitors has any
assurance that a third jurisdiction will not duplicate its efforts. 40
Nor, given the low cost of reincorporation, 41 does the potential
competitor have any assurance that its new customers will remain.
39
See Alva, supra note 32, at 906-08 (discussing concerns regarding anti-takeover
legislation in Delaware).
40
See Ronald J. Daniels, Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive
Corporate Law Market, 36 MCGILL L.J. 130, 182 (1991) (explaining "prisoner's dilemma" in
which jurisdictions fear making investments that new competitors could duplicate or
undermine).
41
See BernardS. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis,
84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542, 551, 574, 586-90 (1990) (noting low cost of reincorporation).
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Second, the shareholders' newly discovered capability of selfprotective collective action may effectively deter management
reincorporation proposals. Beginning in the late 1980s, incidents of
shareholder resistance caused managers to drop the assumption of
automatic shareholder approval of anti-takeover proposals requiring
charter amendment. 42 Thus, departure from Delaware may not be
the open option it used to be, and charters may have become
somewhat embedded within the supposedly dynamic competitive
system.
2. The Bar as Interest Group. Full description of the incentives
that shape Delaware law requires mention of conflicting interests
on the supply side. Even as the managers implicitly rely on the
Delaware bar to represent their interests in the state, management's interests are far from perfectly aligned with those of the bar
since litigation against managers provides a source of the bar's
income. Delaware's process rules advance this local interest. The
rules encourage derivative litigation, 43 making sure that the local
bar gets a share of the action by requiring that Delaware lawyers
make appearances and filings. 44 Competing demands also result in
some systemic concessions to managers, but the concessions by no
means counter Delaware's reputation as a fee-generating center for
corporate lawyers. 45
Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller have explained the litigation
rules with a supply-side account that highlights the impact of

42
See ROMANO, supra note 5, at 68-69 (discussing shareholder pressure on Pennsylvania
firms to opt out of state's anti-takeover statute); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity
Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 571 (1990) (noting that anti-takeover amendments that
passed got only 50% to 60% of the votes).
43
Delaware differs from many jurisdictions in not requiring plaintiffs in shareholder
derivative actions to post security for expenses. DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1 (1991). Delaware
facilitates service of process on nonresident directors with a broad consent to service statute.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (Supp. 1998). Delaware also is liberal in its fee awards to
derivative plaintiffs' lawyers. Under its nonpecuniary settlement practice, defending
managers can trade a high fee for a small overall recovery. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future
of Corporate Federalism: State Competition and the New Trend Toward De Facto Federal
Minimum Standards, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 759, 761-62 (1987).
44
DEL. SUP. CT. R. 12 (1991), DEL. CH. CT. R. 170 (1991).
45
Cary, who favored strict fiduciary law control of management conduct, explained the
concessions as a special exception keyed to the interests of the Delaware bar. Cary, supra
note 1, at 686-88.

1

'·~
l

2000]

PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY

461

internal interest group politics on Delaware law. 46 Macey and
Miller assert that, unlike Delaware, a state acting as a pure profit
maximizer would limit legal fees incident to the domicile therein so
as to maximize franchise tax revenues. 47 Delaware fails to conform
to this product model's predictions because the bar acts as a small,
cohesive interest group that extracts special concessions from the
legislature at the expense of the general public. 48
Macey and Miller rightly emphasize the organized bar's political
power. However, two factors that align the interests of the bar with
those of the rest of the state should be added to their description.
First, the federal threat may temper the incentive of Delaware's
lawyers to lobby for a reduction in direct charges to customers.
Increasing Delaware's market share substantially above the level of
one half of public incorporations would make Delaware even more
of a "national" lawmaking center, enhancing its visibility and
vulnerability to challenge at the national level. Given a state with
a monopoly position, traditional federalism objections to intervention carry less weight. Second, rules that encourage litigation in
Delaware play a secondary role in production. As noted above,
Delaware's case law and judges figure prominently in its substantive law product line. Delaware, however, cannot unilaterally
control the production of Delaware case law. The first option on the
choice of the forum for new disputes tends to lie with the plaintiff,
and in many instances Delaware law questions can be litigated in
other states or in federal courts. This fact gives Delaware a reason
to offer incentives to plaintiffs. Plaintiff cooperation gives Delaware
the opportunity to apply its own law, preserving the first mover
advantage and generating a flow of cases. These cases, in turn, are
products sold in the charter market. The need to satisfy the
demands of the national plaintiffs' bar reinforces the internal
bargaining position of Delaware's bar, further explaining the state's
delegation to the bar of the corporate legislative function. However,
the delegation to the bar also helps to stabilize the capture arrangement with mana gement.

46
47
48

Macey & Miller, supra note 22, a t 471-72.
Id . at 472-73 , 498, 503-04.
Id. a t 504-08.
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III. THE JUDICIARY AS INTEREST GROUP: DELAWARE
CASE LAW AND MULTIPLE DEMANDS

The Delaware judiciary plays an independent role in a multiple
demand model. Its incentives are multifaceted. Like all judges,
Delaware judges stake reputational capital in their working roles.
As Delaware judges, they must pursue the state's interest in
balancing the conflicting interest group demands. They accordingly
act as mediators. But they are not merely arbitrators in robes. As
judges, they have an independent reputational incentive to protect
the legitimacy of the system in a public policy sense. 49 Delaware
judges have represented a commitment to this aspect of the judicial
role in the past, describing themselves as not only mediators
between management and shareholders but also protectors of
market risk-taking who nevertheless impose ethical constraints. 5°
Finally, judges cannot escape expectations that they should operate
under the rule of principle, narrowly defined.
1. The Move to a More Even-Handed Mediation. Cary accused
the Delaware courts of monolithic fidelity to management interests,
citing a cluster of cases as evidence: (1) Chef{ v. Mathes, 5 1 which
permitted management "with impunity" to spend corporate money
to entrench itself against tender offers; 52 (2) American Hardware
Corp. v. Savage Arms Corp., 53 which refused to enjoin a defensive
9
'
See Eric Rasmussen, Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game, 10 J. L. ECON. & ORGS.
63, 72-74, 78-80 (1994) (offering repeat game model of judicial motivation with infinite time
horizons resulting in multiplicity of equilibria in which outcomes depend on players'
expectations and showing that judges follow precedent if there is self-enforcing system based
less on compulsion than need to uphold systemic legitimacy); see also Thomas J . Miceli &
Mertin M. Cosgel, Reputation and Judicial Decisionmaking, 23 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 31,
44-49 (1994) (modeling preferences of judges on utility function that includes both private and
reputational component, with decision as to whether to follow precedent turning on trade off
between two components, and equilibrium rate of adherence to precedent depending on
distribution of preferences across population).
50
See Moore et al., supra note 25, at 779-82 (describing views of then-associate justice
of Delaware Supreme Court). They also have acknowledged the federal threat. See William
T. Quillen, The Federal-State Corporate Law Relationship-A Response to Professor
Seligman's Call for Federal Preemption of State Corporate Fiduciary Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV.
107, 129 (1993) (stating that Delaware's "middle of the road" approach has ensured its
position as premiere state of incorporation).
51
199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
52
Cary, supra note 1, at 673-75.
53
136 A.2d 690 (Del. 1957).
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shareholders' meeting called on short notice or to act respecting a
proxy statement the court acknowledged to be incomplete; 54 (3)
Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 55 which permitted firms to use
charter amendments effected through common shareholder voting
power to strip preferred stockholders of contract rights and first
articulated the doctrine of independent legal significance; 56 ( 4)
Raritan v. Area Electronics, Inc., 5 7 which extended the doctrine of
independent legal significance to mergers and acquisitions so as to
assure a literal rather than purposive and policy-driven reading of
the code; 58 (5) Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien 59 and Getty Oil Co. v.
Skelly Oil Co., 60 both of which left the burden of proof on complaining minority shareholders in conflict of interest situations; 61 and (5)
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 62 which absolved
management of a duty of care respecting subordinates' criminal
conduct absent actual knowledge. 63
The Delaware courts proved sensitive to Cary's allegations of
corruption, 64 becoming noticeably more responsive to the shareholder interest in the quarter century since 197 4. 65 Not all of the
cases Cary cited are good law today. Chef{, a mainstay of management takeover defensive practice, fell to Unocal 66 and Revlon 67
during the takeover wars of the 1980s. Graham was undermined

54

Cary, supra note 1, at 675-77.
11 A.2d 331 (Del. 1940).
56
Cary, supra note 1, at 677-78.
57
188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963).
58
Cary, supra note 1, at 679.
59
280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
60
267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970).
61
Cary, supra note 1, at 680-83.
62
188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
63
Cary, supra note 1, at 683-84.
61
ld. at 684, 696-98.
65
For empirical confirmation, see Douglas M. Branson, Indeterminacy: The Final
Ingredient in an Interest Group Analysis of Corporate Law, 43 V AND . L. REV. 85, 104-08 (1990)
(presenting study of Supreme Court cases decided between 1974 and 1987 which shows larger
number of proshareholder results than promanager results).
66
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,954-55 (Del. 1985) (noting changed
circumstances since Chef( and applying expanded review of tender offer defensive tactics
under proportionality test).
67
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1985)
(inventing duty of m a nageme nt to defend tender offer to auction company in limited
circumstances).
55
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more recently, 68 untenable in light of a generation of contrary
management practice under the monitoring model of corporate
governance. 69 A similar fate could be suggested for Getty Oil.
American Hardware might well come out differently today, given
Unocal and other cases more closely scrutinizing management
procedural manipulations 70 and misrepresentations. 71 Havender
and Hariton are still good law, but they operate in a less relentlessly ·
management-favorable context. A good faith duty to preferred
stockholders has been acknowledged, 72 and mergers are subject to
a more broad-ranging fiduciary scrutiny. Only Sinclair Oil stands
unqualified.
The break with the past first manifested itself in 1977 when
Singer v. Magnavox Co. 73 imposed strict fiduciary standards on
parent firms in cash-out mergers. Singer is famous for having come
down after the Supreme Court removed an immediate threat of
federal preemption of state fiduciary rules under the antifraud rules
of the securities laws. 74 The story told at the time was that the
brush with preemption at the hands of the federal judiciary and the
critical atmosphere provoked by Cary and others prompted the
Delaware Supreme Court to reverse its direction so as better to
accommodate the interests of investors and thereby diminish the
possibility of future threats of intervention. The federal threat thus
had impressed upon the Delaware courts the practical importance

68

In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969-70 (Del. Ch. 1996).
S ee E. Norman Veasey & William E . Manning, Codified Standard-Safe Harbor or
Uncharted Reef? An Analysis of the Model Act Standard of Care Compared to Delaware Law,
35 Bus. LAw. 919, 929-30 (1980) (discussing Getty).
70
Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659-60 (Del. Ch. 1988) (confirming that
defe rential business judgment rule did not shield from scrutiny directors' decision to add two
new members to board of directors because decision interfered with effectiveness of
shareholder consent process).
71
Zirn v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 778 (Del. 1993) (confirming director duty of full
disclosure to shareholders in connection with merger).
72
See, e.g., HB Korenvaes Invs. v. Marriott Corp., 1993 Fed. Sec. L. Rep . (CCH) ,197,728
(Del. Ch. 1993) (acknowledging such duty in context of proposed spin-off and special dividend
to be paid to common stockholders).
73
380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
74
Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S . 462, 479-80 (1977). Prior to Santa Fe Industries
there was a cognizable chance that much conduct covered by state fiduciary law would be
found to be "manipulative" or "fraudulent" conduct violative of section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder.
69
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of solicitude to shareholder interests. Note, however, that judicial
reputations depend on comparisons with the performance of judges
on other courts, state and federal. Thus, a critical atmosphere can
arouse reputational concerns even with a less immediate federal
threat.
The Singer rule did not last long, being in turn rejected in 1983
for a looser, process-based approach in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 75
However, the post-Cary behavior pattern persisted as the courts
articulated unexpected new shareholder-protective applications of
basic fiduciary rules. In addition to Unocal and Revlon, this
occurred with Smith v. Van Gorkom 76 and Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc., 77 both surprisingly aggressive in their applications of the duty
of care to board approvals of proposed mergers, and in Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. (In re Paramount
Communications, Inc. Shareholders' Litigation), 78 with its broadly
phrased directive to managers under hostile attack to enhance
shareholder value. Less surprising but equally important is the
recent invalidation of a delayed-redemption poison pill in Quickturn
Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro. 79 The pattern is volatile, however.
Equally famous cases restrict the application of the new rules. In
addition to Weinberger, one thinks of Moran v. Household International, 80 with its validation of the poison pill, and Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 81 with its apparent allowance of
extraordinary latitude to managers defending against a tender offer
that disrupts preexisting plans for a friendly merger. Occasional
trial balloons float around as well, like the Delaware Supreme

75
457 A.2d 701, 704, 715 (Del. 1983) (overruling Singer in favor ofless restrictive process
scrutiny of cash-out mergers).
76
488 A.2d 858, 873-81 (Del. 1985) (expanding duty of care to cover board approval of
arm's-iength merger).
77
634 A.2d 345, 366-71 (Del. 1993) (applying heightened duty of care scrutiny of
boardroom merger decision and suggesting expanded remedial concept inclusive of postmerger gain).
78
637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994) (holding that management has obligation to achieve best value
reasonably available for shareholders).
79
721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).
eo 500 A.2d 1346, 1356-57 (Del. 1985) (sustaining poison pill defense under Unoca[).
81
571 A.2d 1140, 1150-54 (Del. 1989) (1imiting application of Unocal and Revlon).
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Court's dicta that disinterested director and shareholder ratification
justifies business judgment scrutiny of self-dealing transactions. 82
This back-and-forth pattern is one of the big puzzles to be solved
in a basic course. Direct charter market pressure does not appear
to be implicated, although we certainly have seen its influence on
the Delaware legislature during the past quarter century. There,
we . also encounter one case of legislative modification of a
shareholder-oriented ruling: After Smith v. Van Gorkom's application of the duty of care caused nervousness in boardrooms and a
substantial increase in insurance premiums, the legislature,
prompted by the corporate committee of the state bar, amended the
code to permit firms to opt out of the duty of care by charter
amendment. 83 However, in only one judicial opinion do we see a
straightforward reconsideration and overruling of a previous case:
Weinberger's rejection of Singer replaces a hastily-adopted, substantive approach in favor of a more workable, process-based scrutiny.
The other judicial switchbacks all purport to lie within the ordinary
scope of stare decisis: The Delaware Supreme Court has a habit of
loudly-perhaps too loudly-announcing that "applicable principles
of established Delaware law" 84 determine the result in the case. I
tell my students that whenever they see this announcement, they
should assume that from that point to the end of the opinion the
court is making it up as it goes along.
2. Indeterminacy and Management Tilt. At this point the
credible Corporations teacher needs to address two points: (1) The
cases' indeterminacy, which manifests itself to the students despite
the courts' representations of fidelity to precedent, and (2) a
persistent and perceptible tilt in management's favor, which
manifests itself to the students despite the cases' thick fiduciary
rhetoric.

2
R

Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466 (Del. 1991); Marciano v. Nakash , 535 A.2d 400, 404
(Del. 1987). Vice Chancellor Jacobs refused to base a holding on the dicta in In re
Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc. Shareholders' Litigation, 663 A.2d 1194, 1204-05 (Del. Ch.
1995).
83
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991) (permitting opting out of personal liability for
directors for duty of care violations).
8
'
E.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 41 (Del.
1993).
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a. Indeterminacy. I do not think the indeterminacy point
needs reproving in the context of this Symposium. 85 It is sufficient
to cite Ed Rock's report ofSamuelArsht's summary of Delaware law
as follows: "Directors of Delaware corporations can do anything
they want, as long as it is not illegal, and as long as they act in good
faith." 86 The summary is accurate, provided that "legality" is
understood to be defined in terms of adherence to process rules and
bad faith is understood to be very hard to prove. Even given these
qualifications, however, this standard is very broad. It is a standard
that creates space for a volatile pattern of application in a world of
dynamic deal-making, even as it also means that Corporations joins
Torts as a course that really can be summarized on a single index
card.
Students have trouble comprehending a case law this openended. Seen from a conventional point of view, it also is hard to
teach. Delaware judges, reflecting a recognition of the importance
of fidelity to the traditional conception of the judicial role, go to
extraordinary lengths to explain new formulations of fiduciary law
as inevitable results of prior precedents. While it would be wrong
to dismiss their reasoning altogether and teach the cases as sui
generis results of single-shot mediations, the cases certainly cannot
be presented as the subjects for conventional lawyerly synthesis.
Here not only do the fact patterns dominate principles, but principles come and go with unusual rapidity.
Historical realism is my main explanatory strategy respecting
this indeterminacy. 87 As the 1980s takeover wave rose, the balance
of interests between shareholders and managers shifted rapidly.
One could not follow the traditional model of the judicial role of
integrity and keep to a heavy-handed notion of stare decisis and at
the same time do a good job in a politically sensitive and mediative
role in a jurisdiction with a market position to protect. Something
had to give, and in revolutionary times stare decisis is an obvious
choice. The road from Chef! to Unocal to Time was bound to be

85
Doug Branson's empirical confirmation, based on a study of Delaware Supreme Court
opinions from 1984 to 1987, still stands. Branson, supra note 65, at 104-08.
86
Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work? , 44
UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1015 (1997).
87
For some alternative approaches, see Branson, supra note 65, at 108-12.
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bumpy, given the complexity of interests at stake and the constantly
changing market conditions. Of course, we still see volatility in the
more relaxed conditions of the 1990s-in QVCthe Delaware Supreme
Court takes another long look at tender offer defense and does not
hesitate to undertake major rewriting. 88 But historical explanation
still works well. QVC is a further adjustment to a changing
normative atmosphere. Shareholder value became a global norm in ·
the 1990s and managers building their resumes took care to
enhance it. The old-fashioned, egotistical entrenchment displayed
in the case had come to fall outside of business community standards. Time left a mess on the table for cleaning in any event.
Finally, there was that second rule in the Delaware canon: Martin
Davis always loses.
The odd cases like Van Gorkom lend themselves particularly well
to market-based historical explication. Van Gorkom came down
early in the 1980s and showed us that the Delaware Supreme Court
already sensed that it was about to see a mergers and acquisitions
market unlike any in previous history. One year earlier the court
had made a critical theoretical shift when it moved scrutiny of
cashout mergers from a fairness basis to a process basis in Weinberger. Van Gorkom uses the duty of care, traditionally corporate
law's purest process duty, to signal to the acquisitions market that,
while Delaware would tolerate all sorts of antic dealmaking on
substantive grounds and would refrain from show-stopping fairness
scrutiny, it was going to insist that boardroom process records be
squeaky clean and accord respect to shareholder value as the game's
nominal object. That request was not unreasonable. Of course, Van
Gorkom is a pathological case so far as concerns its business details.
Thus, in my class there are two scapegoats for the excesses of the
era: Michael Milken and Jerry Van Gorkom.
It recently has been suggested that Delaware cases' indeterminacy stems from more strategic concerns and amounts to an abuse
of the state's dominant position in the charter market. The story is
that indeterminate case law enhances Delaware's market position

88

Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 41 (DeL 1993).
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by making its law incompatible with the law of other states. 89 If
Delaware articulated a more conventional collection of rules and
standards, it would be easier for other states to mark up Delaware
law and go into competition. The states could then follow Delaware
law even as they made their own corporate law, enhancing their
attractiveness to reincorporating firms. To the extent that Delaware law is indeterminate, in contrast, it cannot successfully be
adopted by a potential competitor. As soon as the competing state
signs on to the existing body of precedents, Delaware goes off in
another direction, leaving the competitor out of conformity.
Indeterminacy, then, makes Delaware the only state that can make
Delaware law. This fact enhances the value of the Delaware
judiciary in the charter market and decreases the chance that
another state can replicate what Delaware has to sel1. 90 But the
result is suboptimal from the point of view of Delaware's customers;
determinacy is vital to business actors, who want to be able to plan
the future with certainty and execute transactions with a minimal
risk of liability. 91 This result nevertheless is a rational course for
Delaware to take so long as that diminution in value of the law to
its customers is less than the diminution in value of other states'
laws to their customers. 92 At the same time, indeterminate law
triggers more litigation, giving the Delaware courts more chances to
show off their expertise in the charter market and enhance their
reputational value. 93
The last point above might be fair. Otherwise this analysis
strikes me as a wrongheaded application of the "law as product"
analogy, which, like freedom, needs to be limited for the sake of its
own preservation.
Delaware's first-mover advantage can be explained much more
simply, without reference to the idea of network benefits and
technical compatibility. 94 As noted above, it is not Delaware's code
89

Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law,

98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1927-28 (1998).
90

ld.
ld. at 1919.
92
Id. at 1931.
93
ld. at 1935.
91
'
The basic application is described in Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law,
and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995) .
91
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but its personnel and their reliable customer service incentives that
keep it ahead and deter market entry by a competing state. A
potential competitor would have to create courts of experts as
knowledgeable as Delaware's existing bench. This process would be
difficult. Well-known, experienced corporate lawyers would have to
be recruited to the bench despite uncertainty respecting competitive
success.
Such a speculative venture calls for an entrepreneurial initiative
of a sort usually seen only in the private sector. However, even if a
second state actually put together a plausible court and proceeded
to compete on the basis of price, it is not clear that compatibility
with Delaware law would present a problem. If Delaware's law
really is suboptimal to its customers due to indeterminacy, then the
competing state gets something to sell: clear precedents respecting
mergers and acquisitions that provide a basis for management
planning. Such a strategy implies incompatibility, which in turn
means that corporate lawyers would have to incur the costs of
learning the new, competing line of precedents. But at this point in
the scenario, entrepreneurial incentives are easy to assume,
provided that the competing state's precedents really do add value.
A subset of corporate lawyers expert in the new law would appear
overnight to sell reincorporation into the new state, a fee-generating
event. The only requisite is that the new state, like Delaware, allow
lawyers nationwide to give opinions as experts in its law, an easy
concession to make. In sum, when conditions are right, business
law institutions can change overnight without being retarded by
sunk costs in precedent legal institutions. The wildfire spread of the
limited liability company presents a recent example. 95 Network
benefits simply do not seem to lock out business law innovations
where client demand is strong.
More importantly, it is not at all clear that Delaware's case law
really creates an opening for a competing state. In theory, of course,
indeterminacy does make law less valuable to the firm as a whole

95

For a law-as-product explanation of this possibility that rejects a regulatory
competition overlay, see William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, An Inquiry into the
Efficiency of the Limited Liability Company: Of Theory of the Firm and Regulatory
Competition, 54 WASH. & LEE L . REV. 629, 657-86 (1997).
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in that an expanded range of possibilities means more risk, and
more risk diminishes value. The question in practice is whether
managers operating in an uncertain, second-best world, rather than
the firm as a whole, really would prefer the hypothesized level of
legal certainty. Presumably, enhanced certainty would be beneficial
to them if it implied no tradeoffs. For example, a "just say no" rule
respecting takeover defense would import certainty96 and also make
life easier for managers. But such a regime would carry tradeoffs
in a world with multiple demands.
Clear rules import policy transparency, disabling the mediative
lawmaker. As we have seen, corporate managers find it in their
interest to stay with Delaware, even though Delaware does not have
the most management-favorable code, because Delaware's mediative
nods in the shareholders' direction have protected corporate law
from federal intervention. A set of strong, clear rules pitched to the
management side would enhance the risk of wakening the federal
dragon. This risk is not a de minimis possibility, particularly in an
activist era in which actors in the capital markets publicly monitor
corporate governance developments. At the same time, a set of
strong, clear rules pitched to the shareholder side are manifestly
against Delaware's interest in maintaining its market position and
against the interests of its primary customers.
As a third possibility, one could hypothesize a clear set of rules
designed to clarify and stabilize the balance that Delaware maintains today. Presumably, such a set of rules would attempt to
embed prevailing precedents in the slavish manner of a restatement, uniform code, or student outline. The question then arises
whether Delaware's business customers really want such a stable
rulebook. For simplicity, let us assume that litigation volume
decreases in a world with this rulebook, 97 but that it by no means
disappears. Planning accordingly does not become certain, even as
probability distributions become tighter. This situation arguably
enhances value. But it carries a cost. Embedded rules imply a
sacrifice of responsiveness to marketplace developments-what we

96

See Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 18, at 1191 (noting "pro-uncertainty tilt" of
Delaware law because it lacks such firm anti-takeover provisions).
97
I make the assumption only for argument's sake.

472

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:447

had when earnings value was based on a five-year past average as
a matter of precedent. Under present Delaware law, there is always
room to validate a new transaction and the lawyer consistently
takes the role of facilitator. Under locked-in rules, the lawyer could
sometimes revert to the old-fashioned role of naysayer, something
clients do not want to see.
In sum, even if we assume that indeterminacy carries cognizable
costs for the clients, it is not clear that the traditional alternative
holds out benefits sufficient to justify a change of direction. This
ambiguity is especially the case when the clients are entrepreneurs,
whose concern lies with the next deal and not with the neatness of
the past pattern of cases. One wonders whether Delaware's
business customers are bothered at all by the untidy pattern of its
cases. The real complainants are formalist lawyers and legal
academics unable to adjust to a politicized common-law regime that
disempowers them even as it generates fees (and articles).
b. Management Tilt. The foregoing rebuttal of the indeterminacy charge presupposes a judicial tilt toward the management side .
It in fact is not difficult for a lawyer to coax clear instructions from
Delaware's process precedents. How hard is it to appoint a special
committee with an independent lawyer and investment banker and
then to negotiate with it at arm's length? Not hard at all, and the
problem lies in the fact that the negotiation process costs the
management client money and inhibits its freedom of action.
Indeterminacy creeps into the cases because the client pushes
against the process envelope and the matter is later litigated in
front of a court disinclined to find liability. If the client/customer
who has gone over the edge is indeed to be let off the hook, the
statement of the rule evolving in the cases is bound to become
somewhat convoluted.
This problem is compounded by the fact that judicial role
integrity requires that the result of such a case be justified in terms
of the fiduciary principle. vVhen management-favorable results are
smuggled in under a haze of fiduciary verbiage, fiduciary rule
statements look indeterminate because they do not in fact determine
the result of the case.
Arguably, this rhetorical skill is an important aspect of the
Delaware courts' expertise. If, for example, we review the pattern
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of Delaware decisionmaking during the height of the takeover era,
the inference arises that the Delaware courts took advantage of
information asymmetries to develop a body of law that gave an
appearance of greater weight to shareholder interests than is
justified on close inspection of actual results. In the handful of
highly-publicized cases, the courts announced vague standards that
held out the prospect of enhancement of shareholder value. In the
less well-publicized cases that followed, however, they took the
opportunity held out by complex facts to refrain from applying the
standards in management-constraining ways. 98 The full set of
results tallied by the lawyers who make reincorporation decisions
signaled considerably more room for management maneuver than
did the public profile signaled by the leading cases.
Edward Rock has highlighted another aspect of this phenomenon.
He shows that Delaware judges use the cases' complex fact patterns
to make moral pronouncements about management behavior. The
culpable manager, however, is not hit necessarily with an injunction
against his or her deal or a money judgment. 99 Instead, the court
announces its dissatisfaction with the manager's conduct in the
course of denying an injunction against the transaction or dismissing the complaint. It is the actor replicating the disapproved
conduct in the subsequent deal who risks a negative judgment. 100
Rock explains this judicial behavior pattern in normative terms .
Delaware judges operating in this mode, duly connected to the
business community through a network of lawyers and investment
bankers, communicate normative standards. They thereby perform
the moral side of the judicial role. Significantly, the resulting
behavioral deterrent is reputational rather than financial. 101
I cannot fault Rock's description, but I would like to expand on its
implications. I agree that when Delaware judges take the moral
role, they do so more in the mode of preachers than as traditional
98
For a reading of the cases after Unocal along these lines, see VICTOR BRUDNEY &
WILLIAM W . BRATION, BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE
FINANCE 1087-95, 1129-30 (4th ed. 1993).
99

A money payment (probably in the form of a settlement) may follow where the
injunction against the deal is denied but the complaint is not dismissed. Rock, supra note 86,
at 1039.
100
Id. at 1023-39.
101
I d. at 1012-16.
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sovereign enforcers. But the similarity obtains less because
preachers can impair one's reputation when they denounce one
publicly than because talk is the only weapon they have in a world
in which church and state are separate. Moral suasion is the
preacher's enforcement device and he or she must live with the
knowledge that more than a few congregants nod agreement and
then cheerfully go home to live miscreant lives. Delaware judges
operate like preachers because charter competition prevents them
from assuming the conventional judicial role of positive law
enforcer. In the conventional setup, only the legislature acts
prospectively. The litigant who breaches an extant duty on a new
fact pattern loses the case and pays a judgment. It is hard to see
from an abstract perspective what makes corporate managers such
delicate beings that they require an exemption from the ordinary
rules of the game. The point must be that the exemption has been
purchased.
Rock confronts the point as follows:
In the corporate context, however, the assumption
of "direct deterrence" is particularly implausible:
There are hundreds of corporations, the directors
and officers of which have comprehensive liability
insurance; damage liability is extremely rare; and,
after the enactment by Delaware of section
102(b)(7) of the General Corporation Law, which
allows Delaware corporations to opt out of director
liability for breach of the duty of care, damage
liability has become even rarer. If the principal
sanction is not directly financial but reputational,
then one must explain how this sanction works, an
account entirely absent from the standard account.
And yet the system seems to work. 102
And work the system does, with reputational enforcement playing
at best a secondary role and the residual prospect of an injunction
or damages playing the primary role. The system appears to satisfy
102

Id. at 1012 (citation omitted).
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management, which is happy to pay attorneys to churn litigation
that rarely entails more substantial costs in terms of money
judgments or lost deals. Clearly the lawyers also are satisfied. For
the shareholders, the system is more problematic even in our era of
global shareholder valuism. But it still is clearly superior to the
pre-Cary system.
The question, moreover, is not whether the reputational enforcement system does or does not work. Of course it works. The
question is whether it might work better if Delaware deployed its
injunctive power more liberally in cases of management defalcation.
Unfortunately, we shall see no experiments with that alternative
approach because charter competition locks Delaware into its
present pattern.
IV. CONCLUSION

Those of us who would prefer to see fiduciary cases that more
vigorously protect the shareholder interest can complain about
Delaware cases as we teach and write about them. But we cannot
reasonably expect to see a significant shift in the decisional pattern
so long as management's voice remains strongest amidst the
multiple voices that register demands in Delaware. Nor can we
reasonably attack the role integrity of Delaware's judges. They do
precisely what their sovereign principal demands of them, displaying the finest loyalty.

